In the exhibition catalogue Information, Joseph Kosuth attached a photograph of his artwork One and Three Chairs and wrote a one-page statement which was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the statement, Kosuth claims that art is an intellectual activity separated from critics and the market. Then, he explains how to approach art conceptually and why he chooses language as a tool for his artistic inquiries. Kosuth especially focuses on Wittgenstein’s argument - “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein, 20) - in Philosophical Investigations and explores how this linguistic nature can be applied to art.
Before delving into each argument in the statement, it is important to notice how Kosuth incorporates the title Philosophical Investigations. He says, “My activities, since 1965, have consisted of a series of investigations which are comprised of propositions on/about/of “art”” (McShine, 69). As he acknowledges in the interview with ArtDependence Magazine (Sauer, 4), Kosuth takes the word “investigations” from Wittgenstein. By connecting this philosophical term with his works, Kosuth shows how much he has been influenced by Wittgenstein. He continues, “Investigations were a kind of container to protect the activity of art, as I was doing it, from being part of decoration, the market, fashion, ‘expression’ and so on” (Sauer, 4). The purpose of using the word “investigations” is not only to refer to Wittgenstein but also to reveal his opinion that art is not an aesthetic material but an intellectual activity. This idea directly relates to the opening paragraph of Kosuth’s statement in the Information catalogue.
Kosuth starts the statement by comparing the earlier art and conceptual art. He argues that a middle-man, or a critic, was necessary in the past because the earlier art consisted of “perception” and “conception.” Here, perception indicates “morphological characteristics” of art such as shapes, forms, colors, and “value as decoration,” while conception refers to ideas, meanings, and intentions (Kosuth, 16). Because forms and ideas were separated in the earlier art, there was a need for an expert who can connect them together, develop a cohesive interpretation, and set the value of an artwork. Therefore, as Kosuth points out, critics played a significant role in the previous art world. However, in conceptual art, the balance between perception and conception breaks down as ideas become more primary elements than forms. In his essay, Art after Philosophy, Kosuth gives further explanation on how art has moved from appearance to conception since the readymade of Marcel Duchamp.
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But why does Kosuth focus so much on philosophical aspects of art? As he states in the previous paragraph, Kosuth has been interested in protecting art from decoration, pop culture, and the art business. His anti-market stance is well represented in the statement. Kosuth points out that, in the earlier art, the audience existed because “the visual elements of the “how” construction gave art an aspect of entertainment” (McShine, 69). The word “entertainment” implies that the previous role of art was to please the audience and the market. In that sense, “audiences” were more similar to consumers. However, in conceptual art, in which forms and compositions do not stand out, consumer-like audiences no longer exist. Kosuth also rejects the expressions “significant individual “works”,” “Masterpieces,” and “heroes” (McShine, 69), which are the labels that gauge and bestow values to artworks. Instead, he uses the neutral term “investigations” to describe his works. Through these avoidances of the market, Kosuth strives to understand how meaning is constructed in culture objectively. By doing so, he expects to “distinguish between the authentic art of our time and that which has its meaning provided by the market as it continues traditions unreflexively” (Sauer, 4). In short, Kosuth believes that conceptual art, which is deeply engaged in philosophical ideas, can elevate art from the traditional “artist-critic-audience” (McShine, 69) system and the secular valuation of the market.
Kosuth makes it clear that art is involved with philosophy. He, then, explains how to approach art philosophically. According to his statement, conceptual art “is not just the activity of constructing art propositions, but a working out, a thinking out, of all the implications of all aspects of the concept “art”” (McShine, 69). He elaborates this argument in Art after Philosophy; “The ‘value’ of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art” (Kosuth, 18). Kosuth believes that art as an intellectual activity can be achieved by examining the nature of art as a whole. Just as Duchamp did with his readymade, conceptual art does not aim to introduce new information within preexisting art. Rather, it seeks new languages that can broaden the concept of art. This idea relates to Wittgenstein’s argument in Philosophical Investigations; “The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known” (Wittgenstein, 47). The readymade of Duchamp is comprised of ordinary items such as a bicycle wheel and a stool, but it contains an artistic significance by challenging the conventional notion of art. Similarly, Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs displays mundane objects – a chair, a photograph of the chair, and the dictionary definition of a chair – which do not contain any unique information. However, by arranging them together in the museum, Kosuth throws fundamental questions about art, language, perception, and mind. These examples prove that one can approach art philosophically by tackling, querying, and expanding the concept of art.
After expounding the conceptual way to approach art, Kosuth introduces his tool to conduct this activity: language. He expresses in the statement, “Fundamental to this idea of art is the understanding of the linguistic nature of all art propositions” (McShine, 69). This viewpoint is directly influenced by Wittgenstein, as he claims in his essay The Play of the Unsayable: A Preface and Ten Remarks on Art and Wittgenstein; “The desire to understand cultural information, and particularly art, in relation to language is the initial foundation to actualize a Wittgensteinian insight” (Kosuth, 246). Kosuth pays attention to language because, similar to art, its primary function is to show, rather than to say. In other words, he finds out that “description (of reality)” is the main commonality between language and art (Kosuth, 246-247). This idea also echoes the argument by Wittgenstein; “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its lights, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems… they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language” (Wittgenstein, 47). Following his statement, Kosuth utilizes language, which is as descriptive as art, to scrutinize the philosophical problems of art.
Then, how can “linguistic nature,” structure, or mechanism be applied to art? Kosuth has endeavored to answer this question, and his attempts can be understood by examining Wittgenstein’s analysis in Philosophical Investigations. The main argument of Wittgenstein in regard to language is that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language (Wittgenstein, 20). He rejects the Augustinian model which the meaning of a word is based on the object it stands for. He believes that a word is not defined by a reference to the object it designates nor by a mental representation one might associate with it. Instead, it is determined by its function within context.
To elucidate his theory, Wittgenstein utilizes thought experiments called “language games.” For example, if the word “game” follows the Augustinian model and correlates with a certain object “game,” the meaning of the term reduces to “a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules…” (Wittgenstein, 3). However, this definition fails to encompass various types of games such as twenty questions, hide-and-seek, and simulation games. It can only be correct if it is narrowed down to board games. As a result, Wittgenstein proves that the Augustinian model, which pairs a word with an object, is too restrictive to accommodate the complex nature of language.
Another “language game” presented by Wittgenstein deals with the word “water” (Wittgenstein, 13). While the term normally indicates a transparent and odorless liquid, its exclamatory form “water!” conveys completely different meanings. Depending on the context, it may refer to a request for a cup of water, an expression of severe thirst, or urgency in extinguishing a fire. The word “water!” implies more than a name of the liquid, and its meaning relies on how it is used within context.
Wittgenstein’s “language game” is not only limited to words. It can apply to sentences and examine their correlations between meanings and functions. For instance, if one says “Moses did not exist” without context, it may indicate “the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt,” or “their leader was not called Moses,” or even “there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses” (Wittgenstein, 36). Eventually, the sentence becomes meaningless since it does not deliver a concrete message. To acquire significance, it needs to be fixed in context and clarify what it supposes to indicate. In short, through these language games in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes that the meaning of a word or a sentence is determined by its use within context.
Pointing out that “the notion of ‘use’ is relevant to art and its ‘language’” (Kosuth, 23), Kosuth inherits the philosophy of Wittgenstein and applies it to art. He writes in the statement, “Every unit of an (art) proposition is only that which is functioning with a larger framework (the proposition) and every proposition is only a unit which is functioning within a larger framework (the investigation) and every investigation is only a unit which is functioning within a larger framework (the concept “art”) and…” (McShine, 69). This paragraph represents that each unit of art connects to a broader concept, just as a word plays its role within a phrase, sentence, paragraph, and context. Furthermore, it highlights the “function” of art, just as Wittgenstein underscores the “use” of language.
Kosuth elaborates this argument in Art after Philosophy with the example of a box form. He assumes that if one of Donald Judd’s box forms was seen filled with debris, seen located in an industrial setting, or even merely seen sitting on a street corner, it would not be identified as art. However, because the box form is placed in the museum and involved with artistic discourse, it is regarded as an artwork. Thus, “an object is only art when placed in the context of art” (Kosuth, 23). Kosuth also touches on the idea of “function” with this example. Although a box form contains numerous implications, its meaning becomes determined and concretized as soon as an artist “uses” it with intention. Through this example, Kosuth reveals how Wittgenstein’s argument – the meaning of a word is based on its function within context – can be reflected in art.
Throughout these artistic inquiries, Kosuth makes it clear that art is a whole, not a part. According to his statement, grasping a certain part of an artwork is “to separate the art’s “language” from its “meaning” or “use” (McShine, 69). For example, if one only focuses on the physical qualities of an artwork, he/she fails to comprehend the contextual “meaning” of the piece. Therefore, “advance information about the concept of art and about an artist’s concept” (Kosuth, 23) are required to appreciate art as a whole. Indeed, as Kosuth articulates, “Works of art, as punctuation, are not a material of content, but rather marks of positioning within the interaction of a context” (Kosuth, 248).
In conclusion, the statement in the Information catalogue illustrates how Kosuth has been influenced by Wittgenstein. Identifying his artworks as “investigations,” Kosuth not only refers to Wittgenstein but also conveys his belief that art is an intellectual activity detached from the “artist-critic-audience” system and the market. He also explains that one can approach art philosophically not by producing materials under preexisting art but by making inquiries and challenging the concept of art. To conduct this activity, Kosuth chooses language as a tool and examines how linguistic nature can be applied to art. By adopting Wittgenstein’s analysis in Philosophical Investigations, which argues that the meaning of a word is determined by its use within context, Kosuth reveals that art can only be comprehended through its interaction with context and the implication of art is established by its function.
However, several questions remain upon Kosuth’s artworks and inquiries. Although he rejects the market, One and Three Chairsironically allows the audience to choose the most attractive constituent of “chairness” among three items, thereby reducing spectatorship to supermarket-like art consumption, and artmaking to the provision of competitive goods (Smith, 5). Moreover, the photographic reproduction of the exhibition attached in the statement adds another layer of “meaning.” For instance, can we say the chair in the exhibition photograph “a chair”? How is it different from the chair displayed at the exhibition, or from the chair in the photograph displayed at the museum, or even from the dictionary definition of a chair? To answer these criticisms and questions, studies beyond Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis would be needed.
Bibliography
1. Ferreira, R. (2018). Chairs, Neon Lights and Philosophy: The Conceptual Art of Joseph Kosuth. Daily Art Magazine.
2. Kosuth, J. (1991). Art After Philosophy and After: Collected Writings, 1966-1990. The MIT Press.
3. McShine, K. (1970). Information. Museum of Modern Art.
4. Sauer, J. (2018). The Language of Art: An Interview with Joseph Kosuth. ArtDependence Magazine.
5. Smith, T. (2011). One and Three Ideas: Conceptualism Before, During, and After Conceptual Art. e-flux, 29.
6. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell.